Why is Arab Spring getting messy? 

(MENAFN - Jordan Times) The "Arab Spring" is bogged down. Initial spectacular successes in Tunisia and Egypt created strong feelings in the Arab region and worldwide that stagnant Arab politics were about to give way to a new dawn of awakening and genuine democratisation.

But after 14 months, we see a complex landscape swamped by competing agendas, local, regional and international, that stand in the way of a simple and uniform shift to transformation.

And rather than follow the pattern of Tunisia and Egypt, each uprising has assumed a shape of its own.

In Tunisia, there was a genuine popular revolt that left little doubt of the determination to oust the corrupt regime of Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali. The rebellion of the Egyptian people was equally determined and kept escalating pressure on the Hosni Mubarak regime, which eventually gave in - though the transition afterwards continues to be unclear.

Contrary to the belief of many who attribute the quick overthrow of the regimes of Ben Ali and Mubarak to the decisive role of their respective armies, it was the power and the resolve of the people that settled the battle in their favour. Clearly, the Tunisian army maintained a very constructive neutrality by safeguarding law and order and not interfering to protect the regime. The army commanders did in fact advise Ben Ali to cut his losses short and leave.

The same could be said about the Egyptian army, except for one basic difference. Apparently the top army leaders in Egypt had given Mubarak ample chance and time to deal with the situation and save his regime. Only when the situation deteriorated drastically and the army was left with the very stark choices of either turning against the people or advising Mubarak to step down, they opted for the latter. That saved the country from disaster in the short term.

It is hard to say with any degree of certainty that the Egyptian army would not have tried harder to save Mubarak had it not been for the absolute resolve of the masses.

Because events in Tunisia and Egypt took everyone by surprise and were also concluded fairly quickly, external players were not able to meddle as much as they would have liked.

Only after Egypt was there enough international and regional alarm to generate mobilisation to confront the unfolding uncertainties and to guarantee the future interests. And from that point on, the uprisings that followed were hijacked by regional and international powers. That mainly applies to Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria, although each case was handled differently.

In Yemen, the uprising was channelled into a Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, backed by the United States and other interested powers, sympathetic to the Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Although Saleh eventually left, it is hard to claim that there was any sort of regime change. The pillars of his regime are still firmly in place, as is Yemen's cooperation in the US "war on terror", a key American goal.

In Bahrain, there was no amount of regional tolerance for any protests. Mass protests were crushed with undisguised brutality, with external support. Yet more than a year later, protests continue in Bahrain.

The Libyan situation was a blend of military adventurism, miscalculation, foreign intervention for regime change, opportunism and international folly. Although Libya is out of the headlines, in many parts of the country there continue to be chaos, human rights abuses and organised violence.

The now dead Libyan leader could not but face his fate the way he did: brutally killed.

Everything in the Libyan operation went wrong: the behaviour of the opposition and their militarisation, the reckless separation of Benghazi, the international military intervention, the foreign countries' opportunistic rush in the hope of future benefits for themselves and the Arab League's fast surrender of its responsibility to a prejudiced Security Council.

Undoubtedly, the people's quest for freedom and democracy was absolutely legitimate, but the way it was pursued leaves many troubling question marks over the future of Libya.

The former Libyan regime was not defeated by the Libyan people who were supplied with foreign arms, but by NATO and Western powers' bombing. Because of that, the opposition in Syria expected similar intervention.

Unfortunately, the hard lessons and the serious miscalculations in Libya were not learned so that they can be avoided, but were copied with worse results elsewhere. Except for direct military intervention, or for arming the Syrian opposition, all the other blunders committed in Libya were almost repeated with respect to Syria: by the Arab League, the Syrian opposition, the UN, the neighbours and, of course, the Syrian regime.

Some Syrian opposition groups anticipated an easy victory by expecting the UN or other foreign forces to do the job on their behalf, either by sanctions, diplomatic pressure or by military intervention. But while many countries called for action, none wanted to be the one to act.

The Arab League violated its own charter by suspending Syria's membership - as it did with Libya formerly - and by imposing economic sanctions that were barely taken seriously by any of the league's members. That did not work. Neither were the league's other threats and complaints to the UN Security Council of any meaningful effect on the worsening situation in Syria.

The Assad regime must believe that confronting the uprising with brutal force would end the crisis. Assad was emboldened by the Russian and Chinese positions at the UN. Loss of life and destruction has been vast and is still going on, though any accurate information is very difficult to obtain amid much propaganda from all sides and the regime's refusal to allow access into the country.

It is difficult to see how the Assad regime can regain authority or any sort of broad legitimacy, and yet all those who banked on its rapid collapse have been disappointed.

This is where former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan steps in as UN-Arab League envoy. Annan's face saving six-point plan no longer demands Assad's removal and thus is a recognition of sorts that an end to the crisis will have to come about through some form of negotiations between the regime and its enemies.

Given all that has happened, it is very hard to imagine Assad embarking on such negotiations in good faith, especially if he believes that his opponents have run out of options. It is a messy, awful situation, and impossible to read the future of Syria.

Syria is also an unenviable example for any other people in the region contemplating rising up for their rights. The lesson is that perhaps there will be no more easy victories of people against regimes, and once international meddling starts, the people's ability to determine their own future is pushed even further away.

Let us hope, at least, that the transition in Egypt over the next few months does not add to the region's bad news.